The Regulation of Lobbying and Anticorruption Programs

By Enrico Carloni

The article analyses the evolution of lobbying regulations within the framework of anti-corruption policies adopted in several European countries, including, in particular, Italy. We are witnessing, in this context, increasing attention for the relationship between interests and administrative decision making, and therefore for «administrative lobbying». This phenomenon is affected by recent regulations aimed at strengthening the impartiality of administrative action, both through repressive means, and through «corrup- tion» prevention measures. In a changing world, in which the different models (US and EU) of lobbying regulation are being strengthened and are conver- ging towards a combination of «direct» regulation and indirect and «creeping» regulatory forms, the Italian experience is an interesting example of an essentially indirect, but «wraparound» and particularly pervasive form of regulation. This occurs in particular thanks to the «anti-corruption» rules, which not only indicate a strengthening of indirect rule, but also form the basis for an initial direct regulation of the phenomenon, in particular through a «decentralized» approach that is entrusted to the plans to prevent corruption.