This article develops along two levels. On the one hand, it describes the special and exceptional regime relating to the execution of public monetary obligations, as opposed to private ones. By now, this is a micro-legislative sector, which may be, sometimes, incoherent and illogical, spreading uncertainty on the precise execution of those obligations and therefore on the liquidity flows available to undertakings. On the other hand, it casts light on the regulatory character of State debts, as may be inferred from the recent legislation, in which the execution of obligations is an instrument for general economic objectives, beginning with growth. In this context, the legislation on the execution of public obligations may produce incentives or disincentives, by leading monetary flows towards selected undertakings rather than others. Nonetheless, these are unplanned effects, stemming from the inefficiency of the system – the non-execution of public debts – and not from a wise and sensible strategy.