The article analyses some of the recent reforms to the organization of the\u00a0U.S. federal administration and its rulemaking process. The reforms aim at\u00a0resolving two fundamental issues: the negative impact that administrative\u00a0rules may have on economic activities, and the lack of accountability that,\u00a0according to the advocates of these reforms, characterizes most federal\u00a0agencies. To solve these issues, the reforms first introduce the zero-net-cost\u00a0and the one-in-two-out policies, and then require the introduction of a\u00a0Congressional joint resolution of approval for every major rule approved by\u00a0administrative agencies. Nonetheless, these reforms, which on the institutional\u00a0level are designed to reinforce the authority of the representative bodies\u00a0(Congress and the President), seem to make the rulemaking process lengthier\u00a0and more rigid. This, as a result, could bolster the hazardous trend of relying\u00a0on \u00abunorthodox\u00bb rulemaking.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The article analyses some of the recent reforms to the organization of the\u00a0U.S. federal administration and its rulemaking process. The reforms aim at\u00a0resolving two fundamental issues: the negative impact that administrative\u00a0rules may have on economic activities, and the lack of accountability that,\u00a0according to the advocates of these reforms, characterizes most federal\u00a0agencies. To solve these issues,<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n