The article analyses the evolution of lobbying regulations within the framework of anti-corruption policies adopted in several European countries, including, in particular, Italy. We are witnessing, in this context, increasing attention for the relationship between interests and administrative decision making, and therefore for \u00abadministrative lobbying\u00bb. This phenomenon is affected by recent regulations aimed at strengthening the impartiality of administrative action, both through repressive means, and through \u00abcorrup- tion\u00bb prevention measures. In a changing world, in which the different models (US and EU) of lobbying regulation are being strengthened and are conver- ging towards a combination of \u00abdirect\u00bb regulation and indirect and \u00abcreeping\u00bb regulatory forms, the Italian experience is an interesting example of an essentially indirect, but \u00abwraparound\u00bb and particularly pervasive form of regulation. This occurs in particular thanks to the \u00abanti-corruption\u00bb rules, which not only indicate a strengthening of indirect rule, but also form the basis for an initial direct regulation of the phenomenon, in particular through a \u00abdecentralized\u00bb approach that is entrusted to the plans to prevent corruption.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The article analyses the evolution of lobbying regulations within the framework of anti-corruption policies adopted in several European countries, including, in particular, Italy. We are witnessing, in this context, increasing attention for the relationship between interests and administrative decision making, and therefore for \u00abadministrative lobbying\u00bb. This phenomenon is affected by recent regulations aimed at strengthening<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n